Mit den Quarterly Lectures on Philosophy of Science starten wir 2022 eine neue Vortragsreihe, für die wir auf Vorschlag von Student*innen bekannte Philosoph*innen und Wissenschaftler*innen für einen 60-Minuten Vortrag mit anschließenden 60 Minuten Diskussion einladen ihre Forschung für Bachelor- und Masterstudierende vorzustellen (Vorschläge bitte an: seminar(at)philosophiederphysik.de). Die Vorträge werden auf Deutsch oder Englisch gehalten. Alle Interessierten sind herzlich eingeladen. Der Zoom-Link wird über diese Seite veröffentlicht, auch etwaige Vorbereitungsmaterialien werden hier zugänglich gemacht. |
With the Quarterly Lectures on Philosophy of Science, we are starting a new lecture series in 2022: we invite well-known philosophers and scientists to present their research to bachelor's and master's students through a 60-minute lecture followed by a 60-minute discussion (please send suggestions to: seminar(at)philosophiederphysik.de). The lectures will be held in German or English. All interested parties are cordially invited. The zoom link will be published via this page, and any preparatory materials will also be made available here. |
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Organised by Oxana Shaya (Aachen), Niels Linnemann (Geneva), Anastasja Petrović (Cologne), Kian Salimkhani (Cologne), Maren Bräutigam (Cologne), Annica Vieser (Amsterdam), and Karla Weingarten (Munich).
| 6th Quarterly Lecture |
Hajnal Andréka, Michael Cuffaro, Istvan Nemeti, and Lenka Zdeborová |
23. June 2023 (16:00 CEST) |
Panel on Limitations to Unifying Computation and Physics |
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| 1. Hajnal Andréka and Istvan Nemeti: Relativistic computation (Further reading) 2. Michael Cuffaro: Quantum Computing's Impact on the Foundations of Computational Complexity Theory (Further reading)3. Lenka Zdeborová: Analysis of computational harness via phase transitions (Further reading) 4. Panel discussion |
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| Venue: Online |
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| Background reading: Duwell (2021) |
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| 5th Quarterly Lecture |
Jacob Stegenga |
12. May 2023 (17:30 CEST) |
| Fast Science |
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| Venue: Cologne University and online |
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| Background reading suggested by the speaker: Birch (2021) and Stegenga (2020) |
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| Abstract: Scientists violate principles and practices of routine science to quickly develop interventions against catastrophic threats. I call this fast science. The magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of a threat justify engaging in and acting on fast science. Yet, that justification is incomplete. I defend two principles to assess fast science, which say: fast science should satisfy as much as possible the reliability-enhancing features of routine science, and the fast science developing an intervention against a threat should not depend on the same problematic assumptions as the science which estimates the magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of the threat. |
Organised by Oxana Shaya (RWTH Aachen), Niels Linnemann (University of Bremen/Rotman) and Kian Salimkhani (University of Cologne).
| 4th Quarterly Lecture |
Kerry McKenzie |
9. December 2022 (19:00 CET) |
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| Physics, Metaphysics, and the Problem of Progress |
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| Video; Slides; Background reading: McKenzie (2020) |
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| Abstract: Metaphysics is often held to be continuous with science. And in many respects it is: it has similar aims and may even employ a similar methodology. However, it is arguably very different in one crucial respect: while science clearly makes progress, it is very much less clear that metaphysics does. This gravely impacts the value of engaging in metaphysics of physics prior to a final theory. Or so I think: in this talk I will explain why I believe this, and respond to some objections that have been made to my argument. |
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| 3rd Quarterly Lecture |
Anjan Chakravartty |
19. August 2022 (16:00 CEST) |
| On the Relationship between Scientific Realism and Scientific Metaphysics |
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| Video |
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| Abstract: Debates about scientific realism (the idea that our best theories and models are substantially on the right track, epistemically, and increasingly so), and debates about scientific or naturalized metaphysics (the idea that, in order to be on the right epistemic track, metaphysical theorizing should be intimately connected to scientific theorizing), are generally conducted in isolation from one another. As it happens, though, these two debates are, in fact, interwoven, because different approaches to scientific realism reflect different approaches to naturalized metaphysics, and antirealist arguments in the former domain have correlates in the latter. In this talk, I explore the relationship between scientific realism and scientific metaphysics, the extent to which their fates are linked, and the sense in which they are not. |
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| 2nd Quarterly Lecture |
Emily Adlam |
23. June 2022 (18:15 CEST) |
| Operational Theories as Structural Realism |
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| Video |
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| Abstract: In this talk I will introduce the operational theories approach to research in quantum foundations and undertake a reconstruction of the epistemic significance of this research. I argue that the space of operational theories is analogous to the space of possible worlds employed in the possible world semantics for modal logic, so research of this sort can be understood as probing modal structure. Thus I will argue that operational axiomatisations of quantum mechanics may be interpreted as a novel form of structural realism; I discuss the consequences of this interpretation for the philosophy of structural realism and the future of operational theories. |
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| 1st Quarterly Lecture |
Bas van Fraassen |
21. March 2022 (19:00 CET) |
| Epistemological implications of Bell's inequality |
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| Video, Script; Background reading: Mermin (1981) |
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| Abstract: I will quickly rehearse the schematic form of the Aspect experiment to test Bell’s Inequalities. Then I will first explain how those inequalities can be deduced if we assume Reichenbach’s common cause principle, and next, if we assume counterfactual definiteness (made precise in terms of conditionals). Finally, there is still the challenge of how to go on once we have to give up traditional ways of thinking, and here I will advocate an empiricist stance toward modality. |